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Are we required to assist wild animals suffering due to natural 
causes? The laissez-faire intuition (LFI) says that we are not. On this 
view, although we may have special duties to assist wild animals, 
there are no general requirements to care for them. In this article I 
critically examine the origins of the LFI and assess its reliability. In 
particular, I attempt to provide answers to the questions such as how 
people who have come to endorse this intuition form it and whether 
it is a genuine moral intuition. I conclude that the LFI is the result 
of various external factors that influence and overpower people’s 
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1.Introduction
Many wild animals endure great suffering due to various 
natural causes: disasters, starvation, disease, just to name a few 
(Ng 1995, Horta 2010, Animal Ethics 2016). Assuming that sen-
tient wild animals are morally considerable, are we required to 
prevent or alleviate their suffering if we could do so without ex-
cessive cost to ourselves? In her book Animal Ethics in Context, 
Clare Palmer famously defends the view, labeled by herself as 
the laissez-faire intuition, according to which, although we may 
have special duties to assist wild animals, there are no general 
requirements to care for them (Palmer 2010, 68). Palmer draws 
support for this view from her observation that this intuition is 
widely held among people. In this article I critically examine 
the origins of the LFI and show that it is unreliable. In particu-
lar, I argue that contrary to what this intuition says, many peo-
ple are in fact seriously concerned about the well-being of wild 
animals and if it nevertheless seems that many people share this 
intuition, it is not because they genuinely believe that we are not 
required to assist wild animals but because their actions and/
or beliefs are often influenced by various external factors that 
overpower their genuine intuitive judgments.
2.Palmer’s Mistake
The introduction of Palmer’s book Animal Ethics in Context 
informs us that the core ideas of this book are developed in ac-
cordance with the laissez-faire intuition – the idea that we sim-
ply do not have general duties to assist fully wild animals. On 
this very intuition is based Palmer’s whole relational account 
of positive duties that determines to which individuals we owe 
assistance. On this account, the requirement to assist others is 
created only on the basis of special relations or circumstances, 
one of which is being causally responsible for creating the need 
of assistance (Palmer 2010, 84, 121-123).
Beka Jalagania
41
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/ Vol. 24, Issue 1
The immediate worries arise when we realize that before 
completely relying on this intuition, nowhere does Palmer ex-
amine whether it is reliable in the first place. This is worrisome 
especially in the face of the fact that even avid intuitionists ac-
knowledge the fallibility of our intuitions and others, who are 
skeptical of intuitions, also regularly advise us to take a “criti-
cal stance toward common intuitions” (Singer 2005, 332). To be 
sure, Palmer does acknowledge the fallibility of our intuitions 
and notes that they may be a poor guide to knowing what we 
ought to do but she takes no measures to ensure that the LFI is 
reliable.
As it seems to me, Palmer supposes that because this intu-
ition is widely held, it must be trustworthy. But this is implau-
sible, for there are intuitions that are widely or even almost uni-
versally accepted but they are nevertheless unreliable. A para-
digmatic example is our intuition that incest is per se morally 
wrong. Most of us are very confident that sexual relationship 
between siblings, for instance, is morally abhorrent, yet when 
we critically reflect upon this intuitive judgment, we notice that 
we cannot offer good reasons in its support.
In endorsing the LFI uncritically, Palmer failed to notice a 
red flag – the fact that the implication of the LFI conflicts with 
another, much more powerful and widely held intuition, accord-
ing to which, we ought to assist humans in distress when we 
can do so without excessive cost to ourselves. The power and 
influence of this intuition is best demonstrated by Peter Sing-
er’s famous drowning child thought experiment (Singer 1972, 
1997), which had managed to convince overwhelmingly many 
people and continues to do so till this day. If Palmer’s favored 
laissez-faire intuition conflicts with the intuition underlying this 
thought experiment, so much the worse for Palmer. To be fair, 
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it is possible to avoid conflict between these two intuitions. It 
could be argued that there is no real conflict between these in-
tuitions, for one concerns wild animals, while another concerns 
humans. But unless our critic is a speciesist (and I assume here 
that speciesism is indefensible), I do not see how these intuitions 
can be reconciled or coexist in one’s mind. The implication of 
the laissez-faire intuition is that if we are not required to assist 
wild animals, and this is explained by the appeal to the lack of 
special relations with them, then we are also not required to as-
sist complete strangers with whom we have no such relations. 
The implication of another intuition is that if we ought to assist 
suffering humans regardless of our relations with them, then 
we should be equally concerned about the equal suffering of 
animals in the wild. So, to be consistent in our moral reasoning, 
either we are not required to assist wild animals and therefore 
humans too or we are required to assist both. The conflict be-
tween these intuitions is more than clear. Given this, one can-
not coherently maintain both intuitions; one of them must be 
given up at the initial stage of reflective equilibrium. Which 
one should it be? If we have to choose between two contradic-
tory intuitions, I suggest, we should side with the one that, other 
things being equal, has the strongest pull, and it seems clear that 
the LFI is not the one.
So, it appears to me that Palmer is not justified in trusting the 
LFI and adopting it as a foundation for her relational account of 
duties of assistance. But she seems to have an explanation for 
doing the opposite: “But rather than abandon the laissez-faire 
intuition, I wanted to see whether it was possible to construct 
arguments that would support it or at least render it plausible” 
(Palmer 2010, 3). While I do not think that this is a good reason 
to write an entire book based on such a problematic intuition, I 
should admit that the resulting book undoubtedly makes a valu-
Beka Jalagania
43
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/ Vol. 24, Issue 1
able contribution to the debates concerning our duties to assist 
animals in different circumstances.
3.The Problems with the Defense of the LFI
In her book Animal Ethics in Context, Palmer opens the 
discussion by telling the story of a tragic fate of thousands of 
wildebeests drowned while crossing the Mara River. She em-
phasizes the fact that virtually no one present at the tragic scene 
felt obligated to do anything on behalf of these animals. Most 
importantly, no criticisms were expressed post factum toward 
anyone who failed to provide any kind of assistance to the help-
less animals. Palmer takes this story to be a clear demonstration 
of our genuine attitudes toward wild animal suffering – that we 
just do not have obligations to assist wild animals.
I think Palmer is mistaken to suppose that this story provides 
any support for the LFI. The problem is that the story is so 
complex that it does not allow us to confidently infer what we 
truly believe about wild animal assistance. Palmer insists that 
if onlookers such as tourists, photographers and the members 
of conservation organizations really felt obligated to assist the 
drowning wildebeests, they would have tried to rescue at least 
some of them or divert the herds toward safer crossing places. 
I think that the onlookers’ inaction in this case is not best ex-
plained by the fact that they did not feel obligated to assist the 
animals. For it is very well possible that they did feel obligated 
to help these animals but nevertheless did not act because they 
thought assisting was unfeasible in this case. After all, one can-
not simply redirect the enormous herds consisting of hundreds 
of wildebeests and one cannot simply pull the drowning pan-
icked animals out of the water either. Whatever was the reason 
for the onlookers’ inaction, it is not at all clear that it was their 
intuitive judgment that they just do not have obligations to as-
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sist wild animals. The absence of the public criticism of their 
inaction can be explained in the same way – perhaps the public 
too thought that assisting wildebeests really was impossible in 
that case. 
Palmer’s appeal to the drowning wildebeests’ case in defense 
of the LFI seems unconvincing especially in the face of the 
countless examples showing that many people are in fact seri-
ously concerned about the well-being of wild animals. It is not 
unusual that many people often demand the onlookers witness-
ing an instance of wild animal suffering to act and provide as-
sistance to the suffering animals instead of simply observing 
the tragic moment. The examples of the public concern for the 
well-being of wild animals include well-known cases such as 
the starving polar bear (Mittermeier 2018), walruses falling off 
the cliff (West 2019) and beached sea animals. Many people 
were initially furious and outraged by the fact that the photogra-
phers did not feed the skeletal polar bear starving to death, nor 
did the camera crew attempted to prevent several walruses from 
falling off the cliff to their death. The public anger was slightly 
reduced after the confronted parties tried to explain and justify 
their inaction, although many people remained unsatisfied with 
the explanation. The situations involving beached sea animals 
also provoke similar controversies. It is quite common to see 
many people desperately trying to save beached see animals 
and when others deliberately fail to provide assistance the pub-
lic is always up for expressing harsh criticism.
To provide a further defense of the LFI, Palmer explains why 
most people are committed to believing that we have no duties 
to assist wild animals. She argues that the requirement to assist 
wild animals is extremely demanding and that is why people 
tend to think that there are no such requirements (Palmer 2010, 
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72). But even if it is true that the real reason behind people’s 
denial that we have duties to assist wild animals is the fact that 
assisting wild animals is extremely demanding, this still does 
not provide any support for the LFI. This is because if the de-
manding nature of wild animal assistance was the only real rea-
son for people to think that we are not required to assist wild 
animals, then they would hold the view that assisting wild ani-
mals is required unless doing so is extremely demanding – that 
is, that the duties to assist wild animals exist only in cases when 
wild animals can be assisted without excessive cost to oneself. 
This view is incompatible with the LFI, for the latter denies in 
principle that there are duties to assist wild animals. Thus, the 
LFI cannot draw support from the appeal to the fact that wild 
animal assistance is extremely demanding.
4.The Origins of the LFI
Although the cases I discussed above clearly display the pub-
lic concern for the well-being of wild animals, it may neverthe-
less seem that many people’s default position on wild animal 
assistance affirms the LFI. For example, the wildlife tourists, 
photographers and camera crew would often rather observe and 
capture various instances of wild animal suffering than inter-
vene to prevent or mitigate them. Also, people viewing the ma-
terials depicting wild animal suffering do not necessarily think 
that people witnessing the scene should have done something to 
prevent or alleviate it. In what follows I suggest that there are 
at least two influential factors that play a crucial role in deter-
mining people’s actions and/or forming their beliefs concerning 
wild animal assistance and for that reason I conclude that the 
LFI does not reflect what people really think about wild animal 
assistance and thus is not a genuine moral intuition.
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Previously I suggested that the practical impossibility of 
providing assistance to wild animals is a major factor that dis-
courages people to act even if they really wish to assist wild 
animals, and I insisted that this should not be taken to mean that 
people reject the idea that we have duties to assist wild animals. 
Here I suggest that the ignorance of how to prevent a particular 
instance of suffering can demotivate people to even try it. In 
many cases people are not in a position to provide help to wild 
animals because doing so often requires special knowledge and 
expertise that many ordinary people lack. Even when no spe-
cial knowledge is required, assisting wild animals nevertheless 
seems to be a complicated task due to other factors (e.g., not 
knowing how to approach and/or restrain a suffering animal, 
how an animal will react to our help, etc.) that often baffle most 
people. It is thus a mistake to judge people’s reactions in such 
cases as conveying their genuine stance on wild animal assis-
tance. This seems to be what Bernard Rollin has in mind when 
he notes that the LFI “may be more a matter of a rationaliza-
tion growing out of not knowing how to proceed than a genuine 
moral intuition about one’s obligations” (Rollin 2012, 250).
In many cases assisting wild animals seems rather easy. Feed-
ing hungry animals and giving water to thirsty ones are one of 
the simplest ways people can assist wild animals; nevertheless, 
many people tend to be reluctant to do so. People’s reluctance 
to assist animals in these cases can be, I suggest, explained by 
what I call the authority influence. To see what I mean by that, 
consider the following quote by David Attenborough:
Sometimes a problem is more complicated than it 
seems. I watched something which was absolutely ago-
nising – a small baby elephant that was dying of thirst 
and the whole family was several days from water. This 
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poor little thing was dying and you think, why didn’t 
you give it a bucket of water? But you’re in the desert 
and you don’t have a bucket of water and the thing is 
very close to death and has to walk for another three 
days if it was going to get to water, so all you’re doing 
is prolonging the death. All you can do there is watch 
tragedy. But tragedy is part of life and you have to show 
it. You can’t have sunshine throughout your life. To 
have done anything else would only have made matters 
worse and distort the truth (Sherwin 2019).
Attenborough’s main emphasis here is on the fact that assist-
ing wild animals is often more complicated than it may seem 
at first sight and thus requires a cautious approach. But saying 
that we should be cautious while assisting animals is one thing 
while saying that assisting wild animals often “makes matters 
worse” and it is thus best to leave animals to their fate is quite 
another. The first message encourages people to be cautious, 
while the latter discourages people to interfere with the natural 
processes and encourages them to let the nature take its course. 
It is the latter message that has been established as a dogma 
among wildlife photographers and filmmakers for a long time. 
Indeed, this dogma is so strongly followed that a BBC wild-
life film crew’s decision to assist a group of penguins trapped 
in a gully was considered as an “unprecedented move” (Zhang 
2018).
The influence of authoritative figures like Attenborough can 
significantly affect people’s judgments and their actions when 
they are in a position to assist animals. The environmentalists’ 
and conservationists’ authoritative warnings that any interven-
tion will have disastrous and deleterious consequences often 
“silence” the ordinary people and prevent them from expressing 
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their honest intuitive reaction to the suffering of wild animals. 
As a result, people often would rather allow wild animals to 
suffer than assist them even if circumstances permit people to 
assist animals without “making matters worse”. Given this, to 
regard people’s failure to assist wild animals as their genuine 
moral stance on what we owe to wild animals would be mis-
leading.
5.Conclusion
In this article I have argued that Palmer’s belief that many 
people share the LFI is groundless. I have tried to show this by 
appealing to the countless examples that prove just the opposite 
– that many people are in fact seriously concerned about the 
well-being of wild animals and they often require others to as-
sist suffering animals. I have also argued that when people’s ac-
tions and/or beliefs affirm or align with the LFI, this fact should 
not still count in favor of the LFI, for these people’s actions and/
or beliefs are often the result of the influence of external factors 
and do not represent their genuine moral thought.
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